University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

12-17-1976

The State of US-China Relations: Time to Break the Stalemate
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "The State of US-China Relations: Time to Break the Stalemate" (1976). Mike
Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews. 1464.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/1464

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

The State of U.S.-China Relations:
Time to Break the Stalemate
Speech by
Senator Mike Mansfield
For more than half a century I have been an interested
observer of China, beginning with my service there as a U.S.
Marine in the early twenties.
to this ancient land.

Recently I made my sixth trip

The China I remember from my visits in

the twenties and the forties is vastly different from the China
I saw in 1972, 1974 and again last Fall.

It is difficult for

one who has not witnessed the misery, sorrow, and degradation
of life in old China to comprehend the significance of the
changes that have taken place in the new China.
The famines, rampant disease, and millions of homeless
wanderers of the old China are gone.

Although China is still

a poor country by Western standards, it is rich in talented
people, a strong culture, and abundant natural resources.

For

the first time in modern history, these have been meshed under
a political system that is delivering the essentials of an
adequate life to a quarter of mankind.
awakened.

The sleeping giant has

China is on the move.

There has always been much speculation in the outside world
about political events in China.

This period is no exception.

But, it is highly unlikely that the composition of China's
leadership will make any significant

-2difference in United States-China relations.

Chairman Mao's

legacy is large and no Chinese political figure will be able
to stray far from the broad outlines of his policies, at home
or abroad.

What is important to the American people about

China is not the makeup of its leadership or who is on the way
up or down.

The significance of China's political scene is

that the system Chairman Mao created for China is working,
bringing about rapid advances throughout the land.

It has

harnessed the talents of the Chinese people as never before in
China's history to achieve common goals.

These are the realities

which carry great meaning for American foreign policy and the
future course of the world.

America should

~~~

procee~

to normalize

relations with the People's Republic of China, as 110 other
nations have already done.
What is past is prologue.

To comprehend the state of U.S.-

China relations today requires an understanding of the past.
American images of China have fluctuated and shifted over the
years.

Since the beginning of United States contact with China

two centuries ago, Americans' feelings have been ambivalent.
Generations of missionaries, traders, teachers, and travelers
have created strong sentiments in America for China.

On the

one hand, these attachments provided a reservoir of goodwill
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and respect.

But, on the other, they created an attitude

of superiority toward the Chinese.

Paternalism has been the

hallmark of American experience in China.

Most Americans did

not go to China to listen and learn but to preach, teach, and
trade.

They were the superiors, the Chinese the inferiors.

Humanitarianism was mixed with a heavy blend of bigotry and
greed.
In the aftermath of World War II, affection turned to
disappointment as the forces led by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao
Tse-tung resumed the civil war.

Disappointment became hostility

when the U.S.-supported Kuomintang armies were forced to retreat
to the island of Taiwan in 1949.

One consequence of this defeat

was the poisoning of the American political system .
personal debate began over:
ever ours to lose.

A bitter

"Who lost China?", as if China was

From this there emerged a policy based on

an official view of China as an aggressive, Soviet-directed giant,
that posed a clear and present danger to its Asian neighbors.
As late as 1960, in a television debate with John F. Kennedy,
the then Vice President Nixon described the threat from China
this way:
"Now what do the Chinese Communists want?
don't want just Quemoy and Matsu.
just Formosa.

They

They don't want

They want the world."

-4 This distorted and mistaken view of China led directly
to the McCarthy era which, a quarter of a century later, still
afflicts American foreign policy.

For too long, United States

policy toward China was based on myths.

Some of those myths

were cleared away by President Nixon's 1972 journey to Peking.
But United States relations with China today are on a plateau,
reached more than three years ago with the opening of diplomatic
liaison offices in Peking and Washington.

There is only one

obstacle to normalization, the Taiwan issue.
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat
it," George Santayana wrote.

That is especially pertinent to

the position in which the United States finds itself concerning
the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of
China.

An understanding of how United States policy came to

be what it is today is essential to finding a solution to the
current problem.

The 1955 security treaty with the Republic of

China is often cited as the impediment to normalizing U.S.
relations with China.
Senate approval of the security treaty with the losing
side in China's civil war was based on the mistaken notion,
stressed by the Eisenhower Administration, that Taiwan was
vital to American security.

Secretary Dulles, testifying for

the treaty in executive session before the Foreign Relations
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Committee painted a bleak picture of what would happen if the
treaty were not approved .

"If we," he said to the Committee,

"allow that island chain to be broken through the Communists
taking Formosa, in my opinion, the entire island chain will
inevitably go.

Japan will surely be lost, you will have a

combination of power there of Russia, China and Japan, which
will be more, a far more, serious threat than anything we have
ever envisaged in that part of the world before, and our own
defensive position will have to be pulled back very close to
the Pacific mainland."
The policy underlying the treaty saw the People's Republic
as a reckless and powerful belligerent, maniuplated by the Soviet
Union.

But the new Chinese leadership saw itself as a struggling

revolutionary government trying to build a new political and
economic order out of the rubble of civil war.

America's efforts

to contain China were seen as an ex tension of the Western world's
efforts in the past to dominate and exploit the country.
The costs of this outdated policy, founded on a distortion
of reality and deep internal political fears, are immeasurable.
Its assumptions and miscalculations were a factor in bringing
about the confrontation with China in Korea.

And it was a key

element in leading more than two and half million Americans into

-6the political quicksands of Southeast Asia.

Thirty-three

thousand Americans lost their lives in the hills and valleys
of Korea, and 55,000 gave their lives in the paddies and jungles
of Indochina.

The dollar cost of the Vietnam war pales in

comparison to the tragedy which that conflict inflicted on our
national unity, faith in our political institutions, and our
economic system.
Time has proven that the justification presented to Congress
for the Taiwan defense treaty was based on a distorted view,
both of America's long-range interests in the Far East and of
the nature of the People's Republic of China.
was never involved in the future of Taiwan.

America's security
The specter of

political consequences at home, not military defeat abroad, were
the prime factors in shaping United States policy toward the
Chinese civil war.

The remnants of that era remain as a mill-

stone on American policy initiatives in the Far East.

It is

~~~

time to

,cu~

''

the Gordian knot.

r,

1

Concerning the Taiwan question, the Nixon-Chou En-lai
Shanghai Communique stated the United States position, and I
quote:
"The U.S. side declared:

The United States

acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the
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Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and
that Taiwan is part of China.

The United States

Government does not challenge that position.

It

reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of
the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.

With

this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate
objectives of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and
"---

military installations from Taiwan.

In the meantime,

it will progressively reduce its forces and military
installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area
diminishes."
America's intervention in China's civil war persists today
through continuing U.S. recognition of the Republic of China
on Taiwan, through the furnishing of that government with
military advice and arms, through the conduct of joint maneuvers
with its armed forces, and through many ties between America
and the Nationalist government which are designed to preserve
Taiwan as an entity separate from the Chinese mainland.
Although the number of U.S. military personnel has been
reduced substantially since 1972, some 2,000 American servicemen are still stationed on Taiwan, including a military advisory
group.

Only

~year

the remaining American military advisors
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were withdrawn from Quemoy and Matsu, islands not covered
by the security treaty.

The Indochina war, the "tension in

the area," to which the language in the Shanghai Communique
referred, is long since over.

The majority of the remaining

American forces on Taiwan are engaged in activities which, if
Americans put themselves in Chinese shoes, would be considered
intolerable, since the activities are carried out on China's
territory.

United States military involvement with the

Nationalist government through the supply of military equipment
has accelerated since 1972, not lessened.
China's position on Taiwan is the same as it has been since
the signing of the Shanghai Communique.

It expects the United

~~)

States1 to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, terminate the
defense treaty, and withdraw all military forces from the island.
This would be the application of the Japanese formula to the
American situation.

Since 1972, when it severed relations with

Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with Peking, Japan's
trade with, and investments in, Taiwan have continued at high
levels.

Japanese affairs relating to the island are looked after

by a quasi-official office called the Japanese Interchange
Association.
in Tokyo.

Taiwan maintains a similar non-diplomatic office

Other countries having diplomatic relations with

-9China operate in Taiwan under similar arrangements.

United

States economic and cultural ties with Taiwan could continue
in the same manner.

However, there is no give by China on

the principle they see involved:

Taiwan is a part of China

and when and how it will be absorbed into the life of the
mainland is an internal affair.
The answer to the Taiwan problem is not to be found in
Peking but in Washington.
United States.

It is a domestic problem for the

The fact that must be faced is that we cannot

have it both ways.

We cannot strengthen our ties with a claimant

government of China on Taiwan and, at the same time, expect to
advance a new relationship with the government of the People's
Republic of China.

The Shanghai Communique, in which both we

and China agreed that normalization of relations was "in the
interests of all countries," was designed as a transitional
arrangement.

It did not assume indefinite ambivalence in our

policy.
Much of the ambiguity concerning the Taiwan problem seems
to stem from the hope that, with sufficient delay, the problem
will go away.

Some insist that, as a precondition to recognition,

China renounce the use of force in regard to Taiwan.

To

appreciate what is involved here, one must look at this demand
from the Chinese perspective.

For China to renounce the use of
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force against Taiwan would cast doubt on the validity of its
claim to the island.

As the Chinese see it, Taiwan is an

integral part of China and, under the Shanghai Communique,
the United States does not dispute this contention.

It is

unreasonable to expect a sovereign nation to renounce the
right to use force to bring a rebellious province back into
the fold.

Can you imagine Abraham Lincoln renouncing the right

to use force against the se essionist Southern states?

d
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a~y unpro~oked .mil~~

action against Taiwan would be a seriously unsettling event
that would set off grave repercussions throughout Asia.

Such

an action would destroy American public support for a friendly
relationship and thus undermine a basic element in China's policy
to counter the Soviet threat.

It would also create great un-

certainty in Japan, possibly leading to a revival of Japanese
militarism and a closer relationship with the Soviet Union.

A

more practical obstacle is the fact that China does not -- and
will not for the foreseeable future -- have the military capacity
to invade and conquer Taiwan.

---

The peaceful merging of Taiwan

with the mainland must be an implicit element in working out
diplomatic arrangements between the People's Republic and the
United States.

-11Although it is unrealistic to expect that China will
renounce the use of force to regain control of Taiwan, China
is not likely to rush the process of absorbing Taiwan into
the life of the mainland after the normalization of relations
between China and the United States.

To China, acceptance of

the principle at stake and the incorporation of Taiwan into
the nation are two different matters.

The Chinese are im-

patient with regard to acceptance of the principle, the obstacle
to complete normalization of relations.

But, while the process

of absorption is inevitable, it is likely to take many years.
When full diplomatic relations are established with China,
the treaty with the government on Taiwan will fall.

There cannot

be a defense treaty with the losing faction in a civil war while
formal relations are maintained with the winning side.

When

Japan recognized the People's Republic of China in 1972, its
treaty of friendship with Taiwan automatically lapsed.

So will

the U.S.-Taiwan security treaty when recognition comes.
It has been urged that the treaty issue be handled by
serving one-year notice of our intention to terminate the treaty,
a right reserved to each country under Article X.
only further confuse the principle at issue.

This would

If Taiwan is a

-12part of China, as all parties agree, serving a one-year notice
to terminate the treaty means only additional delay in reconciling our official diplomatic posture with national policy.
It has also been argued that disengagement from the treaty
commitment to the Republic of China will cause America's allies
to question our resolve about other defense obligations.

Every

nation recognizes that the national interest must control foreign
polky.

If it were otherwise, a nation would be placed in a

straight jacket with the ratification of every treaty.
are not forever.

Treaties

They are national commitments which must be

adjusted in the light of changing international realities and
a clearer perception of the national interest.

The Taiwan treaty

was founded on what, at the time, were thought to be U.S. security
needs against a Moscow-directed axis with Peking.

That assump-

tion is now known to have been but a myth.
Some say that Taiwan may either declare its independence
or turn to the Soviet Union if the United States severs the
treaty relationship.

This ignores the fact that Taiwan's life-

blood, until it is absorbed into the economy of the mainland at
some time in the distant future, is continued trade with the
United States and Japan.

Neither country could afford to do

business with a break-away Taiwan or a Taiwan allied with
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China's antagonist.

These are not realistic alternatives

for Taiwan.
Formal diplomatic recognition of a nation does not mean
approval of either its government or its political philosophy .
The Cranston Resolution, adopted by the Senate seven years
ago, stated:

'When the United States recognizes a foreign

government and exchanges representatives with it, this does not
of itself imply that the United States approves of the form,
ideology or policy of that government."

In other words, the

Senate said that diplomatic recognition is but a recognition
of reality.
Bipartisanship has been the hallmark of our China policy
since the opening began.

Shortly before President Nix on's

journey to Peking the Senate passed a resolution giving, and
I quote:

" .•. full support to the President in seeking the

normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China."
But Congress does not have a role in the recognition process.
Although Congressional action may be necessary to arrange for
continuation of trade and related ties to Taiwan to accord with
a U.S. version of the Japanese formula, the recognition of
foreign governments is the sole responsibility of the President.
President Ford has stated on a number of occasions that

-14the United States is determined "to complete the normalization
of relations with the People's Republic of China on the basis

jq.~tw-~:-..~~~~

of the Shanghai Communique." AHowever, steps to do so have
been taken with great reluctance .
avoidance.

There has been a policy of

With the principal antagonists in the Chinese civil

war now gone, it is time to wipe the slate clean.
Taiwan is a point of utmost sensitivity in China's new
national consciousness.

It is a constant reminder of China's

humiliation at the hands of outside powers.

Equivocation over

the Taiwan problem has continued far too long.

Ambivalence has

created a dangerous situation and further delay could bring
about serious long-term consequences for American policy in the
Pacific area.

For more than six years we pursued a war in

Indochina in the name of an illusive , undefined "peace with
honor," a quest which resulted in trag ic losses of life and
treasure.

Now there are signs that the same chimera is creating

a similar situation concerning the resolution of the Taiwan
problem.
Delay has created new pressures for retention of the status
quo.

Some imply that there is an easy way out, such as through

a "two-Germany's" formula.

Stagnation is the enemy of a sound,

constructive foreign policy, and indecision in policy-making
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about Taiwan is providing a political impetus for pushing
citizens into choosing sides.

There is a strong hint of a

resurgence of the divisiveness of a quarter century ago that
led to the current policy dilemma.

Failure to face up to the

Taiwan issue will only make the inevitable decision more
difficult, controversial, and divisive.
There are other dangers in delay.

The internal problems

of China in the wake of Mao's departure could create conditions
in both countries where the mutual interests now sustaining the
relationship will be weakened.

Delay may well strengthen the

hand of elements in the Chinese leadership who seek to ease
tensions with their fellow Communists in the Soviet Union.

The

resumption of friendly relations with China stems in large part
from the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Absent a settlement of the Taiwan

issue, this expediency sustains the U.S.-China relationship.
Mao's legacy of ideological animosity to the Soviet Union, at
least for the present, will be a restraining influence on
Chinese accommodation with the Soviet Union.

There are indica-

tions, however, that steps may be taken to settle the dispute
and return Sino-Soviet relations to a more normal state of
affairs.

A thaw is possible and, when it comes, it is imperative

that our relations with China be in good repair.
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U.S. policies on the Taiwan issue are still saddled
with anachronisms.

We lag behind more than a hundred nations

in dealing with a fundamental reality of the situation in Asia.
We remain tied to a past which is fast receding into history
and which has little relevance to the contemporary needs of
the United States.
To weigh the United States-China relationship in a
reasonable context, Americans must look at common interests,
not at our differences.

That is what has brought the two

countries together in the current unorthodox relationship.
- We are both greatly concerned about the Soviet Union
and its intentions.
- We both have a need for better mutual understanding
to avoid future miscalculations.
- We have a common interest in the moderation of tensions
in Asia and in seeing that the nations in the area remain
free of domination by outside powers.
- We both desire a viable Japan free of the danger of
militarism.
- We both seek a better world for the future generations
in our respective countries.

-17For more than two decades the United States closed its
official mind to China and the channels of effective communication between the two nations were blocked.

The consequences

of this period of know-nothingness still linger.

Miscalculations

about China may well have been the main factor in the involvement of the United States in two major wars in Asia in a single
generation.

Pressures are at work which could cause another

major miscalculation over Taiwan.
The national interest is deeply involved in moving
~rtber-daley

to settle the Taiwan problem.

withou~

Further delay could

well prove to be another in the long series of disastrous miscalculations which have afflicted U.S. foreign policy in Asia
since World War II .

Solving this problem will put the United

States in a unique position in the triangular relationship.

If

we act more wisely than in the past, we will act now, not on
the basis of emotional catch-phrases, but on the basis of
rational contemporary American interests in the Western Pacific.

